Managed care payment formulas commonly allocate more money for medically complex populations, but ignore most social determinants of health (SDH).
R ather than individuals paying for each medical service they use, health insurance creates a pooled budget to pay for a population's health care; the money can be used to pay bills directly (fee-for-service [FFS] ) or to contract with managed care organizations (MCOs), with each MCO receiving a "global payment" to care for its enrolled population. Higher-than-average payments are made for needier patients through risk adjustment; otherwise, MCOs with costlier patients would go broke. Most risk models account for medical problems (diagnoses on claims), age, and sex. However, since social determinants of health (SDH) such as poverty and limited education also affect the ability to seek medical care, adhere to medical recommendations [1] [2] [3] and achieve good outcomes, risk formulas should consider SDH. 4, 5 Accounting for social risk in value-based purchasing addresses root causes of poor health and high costs, such as housing, nutritional, and behavioral health needs. 6 Comprehensive risk models also bolster the business case for health equity. and for risk adjusting Affordable Care Act (ACA) Marketplace payments. We describe MassHealth's first-in-nation payment model to include SDH variables, implemented in October 2016 for MCOs-and for "accountable care organizations" (ACOs) now being organized.
Inadequate risk adjustment takes money from vulnerable patients and their clinicians, and generates unearned profits for plans that shun needier patients. Risk adjustment adjusts payments to each MCO or ACO to the risk (that is, expected needs) of the particular individuals it enrolls. Extra SDHbased dollars can, for example, address a woman's repeated respiratory hospitalizations by housing her if she is homeless, or by buying an air conditioner or removing allergens at her home.
Methods

Overview
Risk adjustment has many applications; herein, we use it to allocate a Medicaid budget among MCOs. We use personlevel data to predict medical spending ("expected cost"). In actual contracting with MCOs, payments also account for inflation, regional differences in labor and capital costs, and other factors. This work was an operations project that relied on deidentified data; thus, it was not considered to be human subjects research, and the University of Massachusetts Medical School institutional review board was not involved.
From 2010 to 2016, MassHealth calculated risk from a diagnosis-based Hierarchical Condition Category (DxCG-HCC) 9 relative risk score (RRS); we call this the RRS model. We sought an expanded SDH model that might better tailor predictions to costs for SDH-defined subgroups (eg, race, disability, and factors associated with housing or neighborhood). We measured how well a model fits a group using the predictive ratio: the group's average actual (observed) cost divided by its average model-predicted (expected) cost. A predictive ratio greater than 1.0 indicates underpayment; less than 1.0, overpayment. Predictive ratios near 1.0 represent good fit.
Data
MassHealth's Primary Care Clinician Plan is its FFS program. We used 2013 data for MassHealth enrollees in both FFS and MCO programs. Because "per member per time enrolled" payment is poorly suited to short-term enrollees, we modeled costs for members present for at least 183 days. The resulting "modeling population" excluded 8.4% and 22.0% of FFS and MCO person-years, respectively. All percentages cited for subgroups of people refer to their contribution to total person-years.
Population Studied
The The substance use disorder and serious mental illness indicators were based on diagnosis codes for conditions such as "drug dependence" and "major depression" (see eAppendix and eReferences in the Supplement). A key innovation was using enrollee addresses to calculate a "neighborhood stress score" (NSS). We assigned addresses to US Census block groups with American Community Survey neighborhood-level variables. 13 Similar to modeling for the federal ACA Marketplace, 8 we wanted predictors to statistically significantly predict cost; be reliably measured for nearly all members; and satisfy feasibility, fairness, and transparency considerations. Hence, for fairness, we set NSS to its average value of 0 rather than use "address could not be geocoded" as a predictor (which would have subtracted about $90 from the annual payment for each such person). Another consideration was how the model would work in a dynamic marketplace where stakeholders can "game" variables to trigger a larger payment than justified. For example, we considered 3 potentially relevant "flags" for housingrelated risks: a homeless designation in state administrative records; a "homelessness" ICD diagnosis code during some medical encounter; and having 3 or more residential addresses in a year (ie, ≥2 moves). These identified 2.3%, 0.7%, and 11.5% of FFS members, respectively, and were associated with radically different incremental costs: about $0, $7000, and $600, respectively. We discarded the noninformative administrative flag. Also, we were reluctant to put $7000 on a diagnosis code that is currently rarely and inconsistently used. Reasoning that homelessness conferred at least as much risk as repeated moves, we used the increment of about $600 for any member with either 3 or more addresses or an ICD code for homelessness. We excluded "persistent use of LTSS" (commonly, nursing home care, and defined here as at least $500 of LTSS in each of 3 consecutive months), although average costs for such people were $7000 more than we could otherwise predict. Why? Because models should encourage cost-efficiency by capturing the need for, rather than use of, services. If we paid for "persistent LTSS," a plan could trigger $7000 in extra payments simply by spending $500 of LTSS on a person in 3 consecutive months, even if better options were available.
Estimation
Following Medicare Advantage, Part D, and the ACA Marketplace, we used simple, weighted, least-squares regression 8 to predict 2013 cost from 2013 patient characteristics for MassHealth FFS members. We then tweaked the regression outputs to conform to policy considerations, such as setting a minimum positive prediction for everyone. Analyses were performed with Stata statistical software (version 14.1; StataCorp Inc).
Results
In the 2013 modeling population, the FFS program included more men (49.6% vs 43.6%), older patients (mean age of 26.1 years vs 21.6 years), and sicker patients (mean morbidity score of 1.16 vs 0.89) than MCO members. See Table 1 and Table 2 . MCO members had higher proportions of children (≤18 years; 54.8% vs 45.5%) and women, but fewer white/non-Hispanic members (34.5% vs 37.7%). Although both programs had 11.5% of members with at least 3 addresses during the year, most social risks were less prevalent among MCO enrollees; fewer had extremely low family income (69.5% vs 74.5%), were clients of the Departments of Mental Health (0.4% vs 1.5%) or Developmental Services (1.1% vs 2.5%), or were flagged for homelessness (0.02% vs 0.67%), disability (12.2% vs 21.9%), serious mental illness (10.2% vs 14.4%), or substance use disorders (6.2% vs 9.6%). And, among members defined by every single one of these social risk factors, mean medical risk (RRS) was lower for those enrolled in MCO programs. Table 3 shows the mean-only (constant), RRS (diagnosisbased), and SDH model coefficients in the 2013 FFS population, rescaled to illustrate payments where the mean-only model pays $6000 for each member-year. The RRS model would allocate the same budget by paying $5157 per RRS unit (average RRS is $1.164, and $6000 = $1.164 × $5157). The rightmost column shows SDH model predictors and coefficients. Each RRS unit adds $3582, and the 3 disability categories add $14 817, $2758, and $1533, respectively. Unstable housing (≥3 addresses and/or an ICD code for homelessness) adds $596. Each 1-unit increase in NSS increases payment for those in more stressed neighborhoods by $46. Thus, for example, to calculate the SDH model payment for a 40-yearold homeless woman with RRS = 3 who lived in a fairly stressed neighborhood (NSS = 2) and had no other risk factors we would find the demographic contribution for a 40-year-old woman ($299, see the eTable in the Supplement), and calculate $299 + 596 + (3 × 3582) + (2 × 46) = $11 733. Such "raw" dollar payment calculations using the SDH formula can be unreasonably large or small. To recognize that care management costs something (even if only to ensure that nothing is needed), and that the costs that we predict never exceed $125 000, we set the minimum and maximum payments at around $15 and $125 000, respectively. The SDH model's explanatory power (R 2 ) for predicting 2013 FFS costs from same-year predictors was 57.2% (vs 53.5% for the RRS model). When applied to the 2013 MCO data, the SDH model R 2 was 62.4%. However, in practice, the model will be less accurate when used prospectively-to pay for "next year." We used 2014 data (not shown) to estimate the prospective R 2 as 38%, which is at the high end of best-performing prospective models in US populations.
14 The principal goal of risk models is to make payments track large, predictable variations in spending of readily identified subgroups, such as those seen in Table 4 . Thus, examining predictive ratios (PRs, actual cost/model-predicted cost) for vulnerable subgroups is key. Costs in the most expensive groups exceed 5 times the average, whereas females younger than 18 years cost about half of the average. The SDH model's payments are close to costs for most subgroups shown, but not for people with a homelessness diagnosis code, for whom it would pay about $28 000 of their $35 000 costs ($28 178 = $35 044/1.24). Another seriously underpaid group is persistent users of LTSS, with mean medical costs of $28 921. Note that the State of Massachusetts additionally paid about $13 000 per person for LTSS, beyond the global payment. Thus, the SDH model predictive ratio of 1.36 for persistent users of LTSS means that the global budget includes $21 265 for their medical costs. Thus, it pays about $34 000 ($21 000 + $13 000) out of about $42 000 (= $29 000 + $13 000) in total costs.
Costs for residents of the most stressed neighborhoods were more than 23% higher than those in the least stressed neighborhoods (1.10/0.89 = 1.23). The RRS model mostly corrected this, with costs being just 3% less and 2% more than predicted for those living in the least and most stressed neighborhoods, respectively. The SDH model eliminated the remaining difference.
Discussion
We augmented Massachusetts' diagnosis-based Medicaid payment model with available SDH and other data, modestly improving overall explanatory power and dramatically improving the match of payments to costs for several categories of vulnerable members. This model, used by MassHealth since October 2016, allocates payments within a fixed budget accounting for socioeconomic and psychosocial as well as medical risk. Paying about $50 per standard deviation-sized increment in "neighborhood stress" can give clinicians who serve 1000 or 2000 people in a socioeconomically distressed neighborhood $100 000 or more per year to support innovations that address social complexity. These might include finding housing, or making existing houses safer for people with breathing problems; teaching groups of Caribbean men to prepare diabetes-friendly dishes that they will enjoy eating; or creating internet technology infrastructure to link (as he arrives at the emergency department for the fifth time) a young man with very little medically wrong with him to a community health worker to help him address root causes of his recurrent health emergencies. Such programs could draw more people with complex problems-those who have the most to gain from coordinated care-into managed care. Such incentives seem necessary, since in 2013, the sickest and most vulnerable members remained underrepresented in managed care programs.
As another example, while paying $600 annually for coded homelessness is far less than needed for members who received this code in 2013, it will both support useful services now and encourage the more comprehensive coding needed to accurately price homelessness in the future.
Even when a risk model does not fully match payments to costs for some subgroups, the model diagnostics illustrated here, which compare costs with model-based predictions through predictive ratios, can identify issues that need addressing. For example, MassHealth will separately reimburse MCOs or ACOs for each birth, and subsidize some high costs associated with valuable emergent expenses, such as for curative hepatitis C therapy. We are working on "SDH 2.0."
Limitations
We modeled only enrollees of at least 6 months. However, in Massachusetts, such members contribute most personyears' experience. While global payments should enable systems of care to allocate money wisely between strictly medical and other services, we could not reliably measure the need for those LTSS, and modeled only non-LTSS costs. An SDH model should probably account for additional important social risks, such as "social isolation" and "limited English proficiency." However, we could use only readily available predictors. Other states may not be able to identify the exact same variables-for example, "client of the Department of Mental
Health" (a designation that requires rigorous vetting), and their risk models will need to reflect the relations between patient characteristics and cost in their own data. Our work takes a first step, demonstrating that SDH modeling is feasible and providing guidance for how to do it.
Conclusions
A payment formula that accounts for medical problems but ignores social risk can underpay for vulnerable populations, potentially exacerbating inequality. MassHealth's social determinants of health payment model uses existing Medicaid data and reproducible methods to support care for vulnerable members and improve payment equity. Yes. So long as the same kinds of people enroll in a program from year to year, both prospective and concurrent models make payments that are "right on average" for groups of people. Indeed, in preliminary tests, our concurrent model predicts next year's costs about as well as the best prospective models do (with an estimated individual-level R 2 of 38%).
About racial equity  Has anything been done to examine racial equity in the model? Yes. Although race and ethnicity was only coded for a bit more than 60% of members in either program, we checked models to ensure that predicted and actual costs were close within each racial subgroup. In our development data, differences between predicted and actual costs were less than 2% for all racial/ethnic subgroups examined; in out-of-sample applications of the model, such differences were a bit larger, but always less than 5%.  Do any of the variables in the model measure race?
No.
About top-coded, annualized costs  What does it mean to say that costs are "annualized"?
A person's annualized cost equals "cost divided by the fraction of the year that the person is enrolled." If a member is present for, say only half the year and spends, say $6,000, then his data contributes ½ of a person-year of experience, at an annual spending rate of $6,000/(1/2) = $12,000.  Why are costs top-coded?
Models that try to predict all costs (including "million-dollar babies" and catastrophic accidents) end up predicting poorly for the vast majority of people whose costs are more normal. In health care, costs above some high threshold are usually covered through some form of risk-sharing, such as "reinsurance."  How was the top-coding threshold selected?
In examining data on all MassHealth members from 2011, 2012, and 2013, only about 1% of members had costs above $125,000. In the final modeling to predict annualized cost for members present for at least 6 months in 2013, the number was a bit higher, but still less than 2%.  How often do people have (annualized) costs greater than $125,000?
Among PCC members, 556 members (representing 0.151% of PCC person-years) had annualized cost greater than $125,000. In the MCO program, 991 such people contributed 0.177% of person-years. Thus, in the combined population, there were 1,547 people representing 0.166% of all person-years.  How many dollars were spent on people above $125,000?
Top-coding removed $33.90 million and $91.85 million dollars from the two plans, respectively. The removed dollars reduce the two population means by $104 and $191, representing 1.8% and 3.9% of the original costs in the two plans, respectively, and 3.0% overall.
3) The DxCG model also includes second-stage "tuning" to ensure that average costs are right within age-sex categories that (among other things) distinguish infants (aged 0 or 1) from other young people and older adults  If the model includes markers for age < 17, why don't the predictions and costs for kids match up more closely?
The model is built to reflect the relationship between member characteristics and costs among PCC members and then applied in MCO data. To the extent that PCC kids are relatively more expensive than adults than MCO kids are (as compared to MCO adults), the model will appear to overpay kids. 
